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This paper is an examination of “small” changes to each branch of the United 
States Federal Government that have had major implications on how the government 
works and its design. Each chapter focuses on a singular change to one branch of 
government; explores the historical significance; and assesses the potential future 
implications of those changes if the trends within the chapters continue. 
Chapter One examines the changes of post- Seventeenth Amendment split party 
delegations using the DW-NOMINATE1 scoring method and senator party support; 
Chapter Two examines the polarization of the Supreme Court since the New Deal by 
assessing Supreme Court justices with the Martin-Quinn Scores2 and the overall 
polarization of each Court, and Chapter Three examines the power shift of the first fifteen 
presidential executive orders and how presidents are changing the way they use the 
power of the pen using the length of time to issue fifteen executive orders and what types 
of orders that are issued.  
The conclusions that arise from each chapter highlight the trend that small 
changes to the federal government have long lasting and large implications that are often 
overlooked or are lumped into larger changes in the federal government. By 
understanding the small changes, the bigger picture can become clearer.   
Reviewed by: 
Jacob R. Straus, Ph.D.  
Collin Paschall, Ph. D./J.D. 
 
1 Jeffrey B. Lewis et al., "Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database", Voteview Database, 2020, 
https://voteview.com/.  
2 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte 
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This thesis is about change and power, not groundbreaking massive structural 
change often critiqued and used as a measuring stick for change, but more subtle changes 
to the federal government. These seemingly “small” changes, normalized over time, can 
have a larger impact than bolder reform efforts focused on the federal government. 
Examples of such often under-recognized, but significant changes are the adoption of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, the slow polarization of the Supreme Court, and the use of 
executive orders as a tool to undo a previous administration’s work. The measure of the 
magnitude of these fundamental changes is that each was contrary to the fundamental 
design of the Constitution as the Founders envisioned it and ironically altered conduct 
done in the name of the Constitution. This thesis is about those “small” changes in power, 
the ones that have created a different government from what was designed by the 
Founders of the United States. 
Each chapter examines a big-small change in one branch that had ramifications 
for all three branches. Chapter One focuses on the Seventeenth Amendment which 
proved a groundbreaking change when it was adopted to root out corruption and to 
provide more power to the people. This pleased the federal government because it 




In Chapter Two the subject is on the polarization of the Supreme Court over time 
and how it has created a potentially unstable situation for the “apolitical”3 branch of the 
federal government. The decider of disputes and the last word in constitutionality hangs 
on partisan ideals more every day.  
Chapter Three will focus on how executive orders have been part of the fabric of 
the United States from its inception, but their use of them at the start of a new 
administration has changed. Executive orders are increasingly used to undo policies and 
directives of previous administrations, rather than moving forward with the new 
administrations ideas and directions. These types of changes over time result in large 
power shifts, and so this thesis examines why and how these changes have occurred and 
assess what it could mean in the future.   
From its inception, changes in the United States government have been the 
subject of intense study. These changes were in fact part of the design and necessary for 
the structure of government to adapt to shifting conditions over time. The Founders took 
great care in establishing a government that was new and different from anything 
attempted before, creating our “great experiment” in democracy. From the very 
beginning, some fundamental changes have been made to the Constitution, starting with 
the Bill of Rights. What makes this paper different from previous studies is that it looks 
at each branch of government independently and analyzes how a particular change had 
lasting effects on governance. These changes, though small, have altered the workings of 
 
3 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (repr., New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 464. In 
Federalist #78, Alexander Hamilton notes that “the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always 
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution.” This is an important distinction from the 
other three branches, and the judiciary’s lack of political power is changing over time.  
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the three branches individually, and ultimately changed the balance of power from the 
original design of the Constitution. 
Individually, these three topics are important, but together they are of greater 
significance given the broad changes they brought to the government and its working 
design. Rather than taking these changes at face value and accepting them as part of our 
government, this thesis takes a closer look into why and how these changes have 
happened, and more importantly, what they could mean in the future.  
Chapter One of this thesis focuses on the Legislative Branch, and the fundamental 
change of the 17th Amendment and the resulting split party delegations. James Madison 
defended the original design of indirect election of senators in Federalist 62, to keep the 
States involved with the Federal government4 Prior to the 17th Amendment, split party 
delegations were the result of majority party change over within state legislatures. In each 
of their respective pieces, John D Buenker, Sean Gailmard, and Jeffery A. Jenkins argued 
that the passage of the 17th Amendment erased the States check and balance power on the 
federal government and removed the redundant principle- agent-agent relationship that 
was no longer working, but at the expense of the expertise of the government from the 
state legislatures.5 6 What each of these authors miss is the resulting power of the direct 
election of senators to the people and the phenomenon of split party delegations from the 
people. 
 
4 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (repr., New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 375. 
5 John D. Buenker, "The Urban Political Machine And The Seventeenth Amendment", The Journal Of 
American History 56, no. 2 (1969): 305-322, doi:10.2307/1908126. 
6 Sean Gailmard and Jeffrey A. Jenkins, "Agency Problems, The 17th Amendment, and Representation In 




There are arguments that have addressed split party delegations and how they 
materialize from States, such as William Bernhard and Brian R Sala, and Steven Rogers 
make competing claims on individual analyses of Senators and their voting in regard to 
split party delegations, but each of them miss a key component that is addressed in this 
thesis- the public comments of Senators prior to election and how well they play the 
politic game to keep their seat when they are the minority party in a very politically 
polarized environment. The methodology of Chapter One and the approach in researching 
split party delegations and how minority senators adjust their voting strategies took a 
multi-faceted approach. Selecting states with split party delegations not resulting from 
special elections or governor appointments as well as Senators who has been in office for 
a bit of time. Then, the Senators from each state will examined by their party support and 
opposition7, looking for trends during individual elections. Additionally, considering 
senators DW-NOMINATE scores, which is a system of analysis to give averages of how 
liberal or conservative senators are in their voting records in accordance with party 
alignment.8 The final piece to the analysis was looking at public statements from 
senators, and most commonly each senator noted how they were willing to and often had 
worked with their counterpart, even if their voting records do not show it. The finding 
from this chapter highlight the difference in how minority party senators operate during 
elections and with their counterparts in the Senate, but the research does show that there 
is no clear explanation as to why or how minority party senators manage to keep their 
seat in Congress. 
 
7 Cqpress Congress Collection", Library.Cqpress.Com.Proxy1.Library.Jhu.Edu, 2020, 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congress/memberanalysis.php 




Chapter Two of this thesis focuses on the Judicial Branch of the federal 
government, and the slow polarization of the Supreme Court and the resulting potential 
for partisan decisions to influence the fabric of the federal government. The Supreme 
Court was never completely apolitical, but a sixty-vote confirmation majority, and in 
general more bipartisanship, kept the Supreme Court from leaning too far in polarization. 
Since the New Deal, this has begun to change. This chapter focuses on all six post New 
Deal Supreme Courts and looks at how the Supreme Court has slowly but steadily 
polarized in a time of Adversarial Legalism, and the result is the possibility of further 
polarization and a foundation for partisan interpretations of laws and policy. 
This chapter used data from the Martin-Quinn scoring method, as the method uses 
multiple aspects of Justices and the overall Court in ideology scoring of Supreme Court 
Justices.9 Additionally, Chapter Two takes data from the Supreme Court Database10, 
applies it to the overall Court, and notes the differences in central ideology of each 
Supreme Court. The most compelling aspect of these scoring methods is when each of 
the Justices are put together to visually see the change over time of polarization.  
Within this research and combining it with the movement of Adversarial 
Legalism11, it highlights the Supreme Court’s power to decide policy for the United 
States using their interpretation of the law because of Congress’s vague legislation. 
Additionally, the potential for future Supreme Court Justices to be more polarized from 
 
9 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo For The U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999", Political Analysis, 2002, 
https://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu/measures.php. 10:134-153  
10 Harold J. Spaeth et al., "The Supreme Court Database", Supreme Court Database, Version 2019 Release 
01, 2019, http://Supremecourtdatabase.org.  




the outset due to the removal of the sixty-vote majority needed for confirmation creates 
an additional layer of possible movement away from the apolitical arbiter the Judicial 
Branch was designed to be. 
Chapter Three of this thesis is on the Executive Branch, specifically on the use 
and types of executive orders issued by new presidents. From the country’s inception, 
executive orders have been part of the fabric of governing from the Executive Branch. 
Chapter Three will focus on modern presidents and their use of their first fifteen, and 
often most important executive orders. Looking at the history of executive orders, how do 
presidents use the power of the pen to influence their new administration? Over time 
presidents have changed their use of the first fifteen executive orders by issuing more 
executive orders in a shorter time span as well as the types of executive orders issued.  
The method to discern this comes from looking at the first fifteen executive orders 
of presidents Reagan through Biden using the Federal Register12 and National Archives.13 
They will be divided into three categories: revokes previous order, amends previous 
order, and new directive. Additional data from length in time of office and the division of 
political party in the federal government are also considered. The larger question that will 
be examined through this data is are presidents changing how they issue executive 
orders? For example, President Biden has issued over thirty executive orders within a 
month of his presidency, but President Bush issued just seven in the same timeframe. No 
 
12 "Executive Orders", Federal Register, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-
documents/executive-orders. 





president within the research entered the office during a major war conflict, but there are 
outside factors to look at as well.  
Through this research, a trend emerges with how presidents use their first fifteen 
executive orders. No president goes without revoking a previous president’s executive 
orders, the timeframe in which presidents utilize their power of the pen has decreased, 
and presidents are using their power to advance their agenda and bypass Congress. The 
context of this research is important to the changing landscape of the federal government. 
As presidents use their increasing power; they are given the ability to work with a 
decrease in checks and balances unless their executive orders are challenged in Court or 
through Legislation passed by Congress; each of which are becoming more polarized 
with time. 
The research presented in these three chapters reveals trends that, if unchecked, 
will push the United States into further polarization and a deviation from the writings of 
the Constitution. President Washington said in his farewell address that the people need 
to be wary of “cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men (who) will be enabled to 
subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, 
destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.”14 
This thesis explores how subtle drifting away from our Constitution and its principles 
over time undermines the functioning of the three branches through usurped executive 
 





power and destructive political polarization. The antidote to this is vigilance of the people 





















Chapter One: The Seventeenth 
Amendment and Modern Split Party 
Delegations: The Habits and Attitudes of 
Split Party Delegations in a Post 
Seventeenth Amendment Government 
Introduction 
The United States Senate unique. It is the only Constitutional feature of the 
United States government that has been fundamentally altered in its form of election from 
its constitutional founding. When the Framers wrote the United States Constitution they 
did so with care, purpose, and intent; creating a government that was a new and novel 
idea compared to other countries at the time. Over the course of United States history, 
parts of the Constitution have changed, but one of the most radical was moving from 
indirect election of United States Senators to direct election in 191315. The Seventeenth 
Amendment changed not only the mode of election of Senators, but also diminished the 
power of states within the federal government. Because of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
Senators have become more identifiable by their party and “brand”16 rather than their 
voting record and connections within their state party. 
 
15 "U.S. Senate: Direct Election Of Senators", Senate.Gov, 2020, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm. The 
Seventeenth Amendment was ratified on April 8, 1913 when Connecticut added their approval for 
ratification, giving the Amendment the three fourths majority, it needed. The following year (1914), Senate 
elections were held via popular vote.   
16 The term ‘brand’ is applied as such as how the Senator presents themselves to the general public, 
constituents, and their personal marketing in campaigns. 
10 
 
Examining the ramifications of the Seventeenth Amendment could be as simple 
as looking at what the potential makeup of the Senate would be if there was no 
Seventeenth Amendment (going on the assumption that party-controlled legislatures 
would select United States Senators of the same party), but it is not that simple. There has 
been an increase in split-delegation representation within the United States Senate since 
the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified. There are three main questions that arise from 
this: how does this happen; why does this happen; and how do these Senators maintain 
their seats when they represent the minority party in their state?  
All three of these questions raise an empirically answerable question- has the 
Seventeenth Amendment changed the behaviors of moderate Senators in states in which 
their state legislature is of the opposite party? The research in this paper shows that the 
Seventeenth Amendment has opened the door for split party delegations creating an 
environment in which the electorate chooses split delegations for differing reasons, but 
the minority senator fights harder than their counterpart of the majority party. 
This paper examines Senators Tester and Daines of Montana, Senators Brown and 
Portman of Ohio, and Senators Manchin and Moore Capito of West Virginia. Without the 
Seventeenth Amendment, would these senators be in office representing the minority 
party compared to their state legislature majority party? Probably not, but looking at their 
behavior, public stances, and voting records could shed light on their ways of navigating 
a seat when their state makeup seems the opposite of themselves. Using multiple sources, 
we can look at their voting profiles, public stances, and overall brand as a Senator. In 
doing so, this chapter shows that minority party Senators tend to have moderate 
11 
 
behaviors, while still voting their party line, because their brand is moderate enough that 
they can behoove the electorate into reelecting them.  
Critical Literature Review 
When the Framers wrote the United States Constitution, their goal was to create a 
government the world had never seen. As Alexander Hamilton notes in the Federalist 1 
that it was up to men to decide “whether societies of men are really capable or not of 
establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever 
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”17 Because of 
their drive and intellect, the Framers surpassed creating a new government; they created a 
government that has been inimitable. While there have been amendments, additions, and 
alterations to the United States Constitution, the one that had the most immediate effect 
on the structure of Legislative Branch was the Seventeenth Amendment.  Ratified in 
1913, the Seventeenth Amendment changed the mode of election of United States 
Senators from indirect election through state legislatures to direct election by the people 
of the state they were to represent in Congress. There have been arguments on both sides 
regarding the impact of the Seventeenth Amendment, but one idea rings true: the 
Seventeenth Amendment gave the electorate the option to split delegation representation 
within the United States Senate between political parties in a way that did not exist when 
state legislatures were appointing Senators.   
 
17 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (repr., New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 27. 
12 
 
Pre- Seventeenth Amendment 
 Prior to the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, it was state legislatures 
that chose who was to represent their state in the United States Senate. Elaine Swift 
notes, “the framers intended the Senate first and foremost to resemble in its form the 
British House of Lords and intended the senators to serve Lords-like functions that would 
both incorporate and precede in importance those mentioned above.”18 Because of this 
design, state legislatures often proved corrupt when it came to choosing Senators. The 
United States Senate Archives describe some of the bribery and corruption issues from 
the 1860s; including “Intimidation and bribery marked some of the states' selection of 
senators. Nine bribery cases were brought before the Senate between 1866 and 1906. In 
addition, 45 deadlocks occurred in 20 states between 1891 and 1905, resulting in 
numerous delays in seating senators.”19 With the issues of bribery, hostility within state 
legislatures, the desire for power, and a smaller federal government, the mode of election 
of United States Senators needed a change, and that change came with the Oregon plan 
and the eventual ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.20  
 James Madison wrote in Federalist 62, “It is recommended by the double 
advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such 
an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the 
former and may form a convenient link between the two systems.”21 What neither 
 
18 Elaine K Swift, The Making Of An American Senate: Reconstitutive Change In Congress, 1787-
1841 (repr., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 10. 
19 "U.S. Senate: Direct Election Of Senators", Senate.Gov, 2020, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm. 
20 Wendy J Schiller and Charles Haines Stewart, Electing The Senate (repr., Princeton University Press, 
2014). 
21 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (repr., New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 375 
13 
 
Madison nor the other framers could predict was the subsequent corruption and need for 
change to create the Seventeenth Amendment.  
As early as the 1870s, there were petitions for an amendment for the direct 
election of Senators, only to be stalled within the Senate.22 The first successful trial for 
this was in Oregon using a direct primary method with the Oregon Plan of 1904. This 
plan stated “that every political party shall nominate all of its candidates for public office 
under the provisions of this act”23 only. This forced parties to go through a direct primary 
for all elected positions, not just for the House of Representatives and Presidency. A 
direct primary gave the opportunity to the people to decide who they felt should represent 
them in the Senate and took away the power of the party nominating conventions of 
selecting nominees.24 With state plans taking shape, it forced the hand of Congress to 
create an amendment that would create the direct election of Senators.  
Post Seventeenth Amendment and State Power Changes 
 After the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, the fundamental makeup of 
the United States Senate changed. With the electorate in charge of electing Senators, it no 
longer was about family ties, party loyalty, bribery, or personal connections. It was about 
the people believing in the person they chose to vote for.  
 Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, the principal- agent relationship was a 
stable and redundant one. The electorate chose their state legislature and in turn the 
 
22 "U.S. Senate: Direct Election Of Senators". Senate.Gov, 2020. 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm. 
23 James D. Barnett. "Forestalling the Direct Primary in Oregon." Political Science Quarterly 27, no. 4 
(1912): 648-68. doi:10.2307/2141217. 




legislature chose the United States Senator to represent the State in Washington D.C. 
Authors Gailmard and Jenkins discuss the indirect hierarchical agency of principle- 
agent-agent relationship quite well in that the checks and balances do not come from 
electorate, but by the first agent (the state legislatures).25 With the passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, the States lost their only true method of checks and balances on 
the Federal government. As Buenker notes, “while the Seventeenth Amendment did 
create a direct agency relationship, it also eliminated both the informed selection and 
monitoring of U.S. Senators by relative political experts, state legislatures. Therefore, 
U.S. Senators may have been held to a better post-amendment standard in democratic 
terms, but not as tightly as they were held to their pre-amendment standard.”26 With the 
States losing their grip within the Federal government, the Senate no longer had the Lord-
like status it had attained previously; the upper house of Congress began to function 
through elections like that of the House of Representatives. 
With the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, this double check was 
erased, creating a principle-agent relationship that matched the House of Representatives; 
the largest difference between the two elections was time, as House of Representative 
members are reelected every two years, versus every six for Senators. With this gap in 
time, it provides an opportunity for Senators to moderate their votes more so between 
elections than House members.   
 
25 Sean Gailmard, and Jeffery A. Jenkins. "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in 
the Senate." American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (2009): 324-42. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548121. 
26 John D. Buenker. "The Urban Political Machine and the Seventeenth Amendment." The Journal of 
American History 56, no. 2 (1969): 305-22. doi:10.2307/1908126. 
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Introduction of Electorate Created Split Party Delegation 
 Prior to the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, a logical person may 
think that there were no split party delegations within the United States Senate, but that 
would be untrue. Some may view split party delegations as a more recent phenomenon, 
but the number of states that have had split party delegations has been consistent since 
the founding of the United States. Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, there were a high 
number of split party Senate delegations from the two major parties at their prime.27 
While split-party delegations have always existed in the United States government, the 
change is within the amount and types of representation created. With the way elections 
are designed for the United States Senate, it is very rare to see a radical shift in 
membership makeup. Add this to the fact that Senators of the same state are rarely up for 
reelection at the same time gives the opportunity for split delegation to occur from an 
electorate level, not just a state legislature one.28 Seeing the difference between the two 
modes of election is imperative when researching the split party delegation. While both 
versions of split party delegations are important, it is expected that State Legislature 
majorities would select Senators of their party; it is an anomaly when the electorate 
chooses a minority party Senator in contrast to their state legislature makeup, as their 
representative in Congress.  
 
27 Thomas L. Brunell, and Bernard Grofman. "Explaining Divided U.S. Senate Delegations, 1788-1996: A 
Realignment Approach." The American Political Science Review 92, no. 2 (1998): 391-99. 
doi:10.2307/2585671. 
28 Thomas L. Brunell, and Bernard Grofman. "Explaining Divided U.S. Senate Delegations, 1788-1996: A 




Attributes of Split Party Senators 
 In looking at elections post Seventeenth Amendment ratification, one must look at 
the outliers, the Senators who are elected creating a split delegation. Modern Senators are 
people who have financial means, relevant professional background, have advanced 
degrees, and have connections within their state. As John Sides notes “Politicians also 
benefit from a reputation or ‘brand’ that citizens recognize and can rely on when 
voting.”29 A politician’s “brand” can either assist them within an election or destroy 
them. Sides makes the point that sometimes a brand matters more than a party affiliation; 
that idea can assist minority party Senate candidates in states where they stand a chance 
of winning an election. If a candidate brands themselves as a bearer of all people, they 
stand the chance of beating a challenger who may have a harder line stance, even if they 
are in the majority party. Stephen K. Medvic, in discussing the elections of Senators as 
whole notes, “Senators may alter their campaign behavior based on the campaigns and 
elections of their counterparts.”30 In conjunction with Sides et al, Medvic et al follow the 
same thought pattern. Candidates base their electability on the candidacy of their 
counterparts in the Senate. The fair question then is how do Senators of opposite parties 
win within the same state? 
Historically, the United States has varied in political polarization. In the current 
political climate, polarization is thought widespread through all levels of government. In 
his work, Carlos Algara notes, “As a byproduct of the pronounced partisan polarization 
between the congressional parties, the value of the collective partisan brand as a voting 
 
29 John Sides et al., Campaigns And Elections, 3rd ed. (repr., W. W. Norton & Company, 2019), 163 
30 Stephen K Medvic, Jamie L. Carson, and Carrie P. Eaves, New Directions In Campaigns And 
Elections (repr., New York: Routledge, 2011), 198. 
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heuristic increases.”31 With this thought process, comes the question of how do minority 
party Senators gain enough favor to obtain their seat from an electorate majority outside 
of their own party? Scott R. Meinke notes, “in contrast to their legislatively elected 
predecessors, directly elected senators were much more likely to moderate in their 
nominate scores as reelection approach(es).”32 With this moderation comes the brand 
discussed previously. If a Senator can adjust their stances within their voting records, 
they have the potential to gain enough favor from the majority even if they are on 
differing sides of the political aisle. 
Responsiveness of Senators Post Seventeenth Amendment 
The responsiveness of United States Senators is often how they are measured, but 
in a society with less working across the aisle and more partisanship, this has become a 
more difficult task. Schiller and Stewart make an excellent point with their data: “One 
might have expected major changes in the behavior of U.S. senators elected after the 
Seventeenth Amendment and even transformations in the nature of the Senate itself. But 
political scientists have come to the conclusion that in fact, while there were some 
changes, they were relatively minor.”33 While Schiller and Stewart focus on the overall 
behavior of the Senate post Seventeenth Amendment, the data they dismiss is the minor 
 
31 Carlos Algara, "The Conditioning Role Of Polarization In U.S. Senate Election Outcomes: A Direct-
Election Era & Voter-Level Analysis", Electoral Studies 59 (2019): 1-16, doi: 
10.1016/j.electstud.2019.02.006. 
32 Scott R. Meinke. "Institutional Change and the Electoral Connection in the Senate: Revisiting the Effects 
of Direct Election." Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 3 (2008): 445-57. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20299747. 




changes. Those minor changes could be linked to the split party delegation and their 
different range of electability.  
There have been many arguments surrounding the responsiveness of senators to 
their electorate along with multiple data sets on arguing claims for or against. When 
looking at hard data, the votes senators make, there is different arguments to be made. 
According to William Bernhard and Brian R. Sala, “Prior to direct election, senators had 
little systematic incentive to shift their public ideologies in pursuit of reelection. With 
direct election, however, we show a systematic bias in favor of late term moderating 
behavior, particularly for Republican incumbents.”34 Using their method of analysis, 
Bernhard and Sala make the case that Senators do change their responsiveness in favor of 
reelection. Contrary to this view Steven Rogers’ assessment concluded, “by directly 
linking votes to seats, the Seventeenth Amendment allowed election outcomes to be more 
responsive to preferences. Even though the institution of direct elections increased the 
responsiveness of southern elections, there were no evident changes in the levels of 
electoral responsiveness for non-southern elections. These findings imply that the 
Seventeenth Amendment is not necessary to create responsive Senate elections.”35 With 
these differing viewpoints, there is some major issues to be noted. Why are they so 
different, does the data truly make that much of a difference? Most importantly, how does 
this apply to split delegation representation from the states in the Senate? Some of these 
questions can be answered by looking at voting records, but more importantly, the issue 
 
34 William Bernhard and Brian R. Sala, "The Remaking Of An American Senate: The 17Th Amendment 
And Ideological Responsiveness", The Journal Of Politics 68, no. 2 (2006): 345-357, doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2508.2006.00411.x. 
35 Steven Rogers, "The Responsiveness Of Direct And Indirect Elections", Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2012): 509-532, doi:10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00060.x. 
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of minority party senators in split delegations are the anomaly. Looking at those voting 
records, comments, and brands are a more concrete way to base the claim of 
responsiveness of the Senator to their constituents along with their electability in a post 
Seventeenth Amendment Senate.  
Split Party Delegation Ideology 
There are multiple ways to examine the reasoning behind split Senate delegations, 
and whether the Seventeenth Amendment has anything to do with it. One item to note is 
that the split delegations prior to the Seventeenth Amendment were not due to the direct 
electorate and their voting choices, but rather due to the direct electorate and their state 
legislature choices. Because of the staggered terms of United States Senators, the state 
legislature could flip in between election cycles for United States Senators, creating the 
split delegations. The phenomenon of the direct electorate selecting United States 
Senators is the direct result of the Seventeenth Amendment. The schools of thought 
behind the voting choices are many, but the most dominant theories are proximity voting 
and the balancing theory.36 Between these two theories, the data used in them can create 
differing results. Fiorina is often cited in the theories, but Christopher P. Donnelly makes 
a counter argument in his paper, Balancing Act? Testing a Theory of Split-Party U.S. 
Senate Delegations: using a different level of aggregate data creates a differing result 
when it comes to the balancing theory of Fiorina's. Donnelly notes that based on an 
individual data set rather than an aggregate, the idea of proximity voting is more likely 
over Fiorina’s balancing theory. Fiorina does note, “balancing arguments should be 
 
36 Alberto Alesina, Morris Fiorina, and Howard Rosenthal, "Why Are There So Many Divided Senate 
Delegations?", The National Bureau Of Economic Research, 1991, https://www.nber.org/papers/w3663. 
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viewed in ‘as if’ terms. In the large, the electorate behaves as if voters were engaging in a 
fairly sophisticated trading off of party positions.”37 The idea behind balancing theory has 
merit, but there are multiple factors that cannot be substantiated within it. 
In looking at two differing schools of thought of split delegation representation, 
more questions arise. If it were not for the Seventeenth Amendment, what would our 
United States Senate look like? Why do voters end up with split party delegations, and 
most importantly, what are the attributes of Senators who are the minority in their split 
delegation? Gershtenson added a data set left out by other researchers on this topic, the 
citizen assessment. This assessment is not all encompassing for many reasons but does 
give an additional insight not noted in other research. Gershtenson notes, “While 
responsiveness is an important dimension of representation, perfect responsiveness 
provides no guarantees that legislators reflect the average preferences of their 
constituents.”38  
Conclusion 
  Throughout history, there have been split party delegations within the United 
States Senate. What makes them different now from pre-Seventeenth Amendment split 
party delegations is that it is the people are choosing the Senators, not the state 
legislatures. As Abraham Lincoln said, “government of the people, by the people, for the 
people.”39 Though designed to be an upper house, the United States Senate was not truly 
 
37 Morris P. Fiorina. "An Era of Divided Government." Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 3 (1992): 387-
410. doi:10.2307/215243 
38 Joseph Gershtenson. 2007. “Ideology and Representation in the US Senate: Roll Calls v. Constituent 
Assessments.” Journal of Legislative Studies 13 (4): 558–76. doi:10.1080/13572330701663637. 




a chamber of the federal government that was by the people; it was a government body 
appointed for the people. Since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, the 
Senate has consistently had split party delegations. What is lacking in research is not 
necessarily the fact that these happen and why, but more how are minority party Senators 
different from their majority party counterparts from their state in the Senate. None of 
this would matter however, without the Seventeenth Amendment. The electorate can be 
fickle in their choices, but the length of time a Senator is in office grants them the 
opportunity to mold their brand in a way that promotes them as the best person for the 
position of Senator in their state, even if their party affiliation does not coincide with the 
majority of the state they wish to represent. 
 The arguments for and against the Seventeenth Amendment are both valid and 
occur at different times since its ratification in 1903. Of the many theories as to why there 
are split party delegations, the most prominent are the balancing theory, proximity voting, 
and specific candidate factors.40 Looking at specific states, their Senators, and how they 
consistently retain their positions gives an insight into how and why voters choose past a 
party affiliation. 
Data 
The purpose of this data and analysis is to decipher how state minority party 
Senators in relation to their state legislatures in split party delegations manage to retain 
their seats in comparison to their majority party counterpart. This study focuses on 
 





current Senatorial pairs since, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, an explanation for 
the split party delegations could be a switch in state legislature majority during election 
terms. In the post Seventeenth Amendment Senate, split-party delegations are the result 
of voter’s decisions, not the state legislature.  
When compiling data for this analysis, there are many avenues to consider. Other 
research has been done using NOMINATE scores,41 Mayhew model,42 or RAW scores.43 
In doing so they have focused on certain aspects of Senators votes and ideals. Looking 
strictly at party support/ opposition and DW-NOMINATE44 scores, a picture emerges of 
Senators and their ways of electability in a post Seventeenth Amendment electorate.  
Regardless of if the minority senator is from a Republican or Democratic 
controlled State Legislature state, the constant that remains is Senators alter their voting 
strategy come their reelection year. Rather than proximity voting or balancing theory, it is 
a matter of how the Senators work to alter their brand for reelection.  
 
41 Joseph Gershtenson. 2007. “Ideology and Representation in the US Senate: Roll Calls v. Constituent 
Assessments.” Journal of Legislative Studies 13 (4): 558–76. doi:10.1080/13572330701663637. 
42 Scott R. Meinke. "Institutional Change and the Electoral Connection in the Senate: Revisiting the Effects 
of Direct Election." Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 3 (2008): 445-57. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20299747. 
43 William Bernhard and Brian R. Sala, "The Remaking Of An American Senate: The 17Th Amendment 
And Ideological Responsiveness", The Journal Of Politics 68, no. 2 (2006): 345-357, doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2508.2006.00411.x. 
44 Jeffrey B. Lewis, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 





Figure 1: Portman- Ohio- Republican. Party Support/ 
Opposition 
 46 
Figure 2: Brown- Ohio- Democrat Party Support/ Opposition 
Ohio is a state with a Republican trifecta; both branches of the Legislative and the 
Executive are under Republican party control, but Senator Sherrod Brown has been a 
Senator for the state since his election in 2006. What makes Senator Brown unique and 
electable? Looking at the above charts, he has continued to stay true to his ideals. The 
standout of Senator Brown is his history in office, as well as his voting record for 
workers. Senator Brown has consistently fought for worker rights as well as fair trade 
agreements, notably voting against the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).47  
 While Senator Brown has held elected office much longer, Senator Portman’s 
party support/opposition record through CQPress creates a picture that majority party 
senators also change their voting behavior during election cycles. In 2016, Senator 
 
45 "Cqpress Congress Collection", Library.Cqpress.Com.Proxy1.Library.Jhu.Edu, 2020, 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congress/votingscoresresults.php?id=pia115-Portman-Rob 
46 "Cqpress Congress Collection", Library.Cqpress.Com.Proxy1.Library.Jhu.Edu, 2020, 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congress/votingscoresresults.php?id=pia115-Brown-
Sherrod 
47 Sherrod Brown. (2017). In CQ-Roll Call (Ed.), Politics in America 2018. The 115th Congress. 
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Portman’s party opposition and support both trended more toward the middle by a 
significant margin in comparison to Senator Brown, who was not up for reelection. In 
October of 2016, Senator Portman issued a statement that could explain why his voting 
record trended to appeal to a wider audience in his reelection saying, “While I continue to 
respect those who still support Donald Trump, I can no longer support him.”48 This 
reversal of support of the Republican nominee could have ended his reelection campaign, 
but Senator Portman was able to use his previous voting history and powerful seat in the 
Senate as a springboard for his reelection. 
West Virginia 
49 
Figure 3: Manchin- W. Virginia- Democrat Party Support/ 
Opposition 
50 
Figure 4: Capito- W. Virginia- Republican Party Support/ 
Opposition 
West Virginia had a democratically controlled State Legislature from the 1990s 
through 2014; and Joe Manchin is a previous Governor for the State.51 With a more 
 
48 Rob Portman, "Portman Statement On Presidential Race", Rob Portman For Senate, 2016, 
https://www.robportman.com/portman_statement_on_presidential_race. 
49 "Cqpress Congress Collection", Library.Cqpress.Com.Proxy1.Library.Jhu.Edu, 2020, 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congress/votingscoresresults.php?id=pia115-Manchin-Joe 
50 "Cqpress Congress Collection", Library.Cqpress.Com.Proxy1.Library.Jhu.Edu, 2020, 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congress/document.php?id=pia115-Capito-Shelley-Moore 
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recent trend into conservative ideology, West Virginia flipped in 2014 to a Republican 
controlled State Legislature, which is when Senator Capito was elected. Senator Manchin 
has trended toward the middle, but since Donald Trump’s election, he has opposed his 
party more often than supported in voting. While Senator Manchin identifies as a 
Democrat, his voting stances have begun to lean more Republican. If the Seventeenth 
Amendment had not been instituted in 1913, Senator Manchin may have lost his seat in 
his reelection in 2018.  
Montana 
52 
Figure 5: Tester- Montana- Democrat. Party Support/ 
Opposition 
53 
Figure 6: Daines- Montana- Republican. Party Support/ 
Opposition 
The state of Montana has maintained a Republican controlled State Legislature 
since the 1990s, with two split houses in the mid-2000s as exceptions.54 Senator Tester 
gained acceptance and traction in his state through his personal background, political 
 
52 "Cqpress Congress Collection", Library.Cqpress.Com.Proxy1.Library.Jhu.Edu, 2020, 
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history, and his effort to work for the people of Montana, not just his political party.55 In 
contrast to Senator Tester, Senator Daines has marginally adjusted his voting record 
between party support and opposition. Looking at the above graph, Senator Daines 
trended more with party support in the first year of Donald Trump’s polarizing 
presidency but is moving slightly back to center the closer he comes to reelection.  
The second data set to consider is the DW-NOMINATE scores. While not 
conclusive, it gives a general overview of how the Senators average their vote. This 
model of analysis is often referenced, as Poole and Rosenthal created a system that 
showcases a wide range of politicians.56 
57 
Figure 7: DW-NOMINATE Score 
Party ideology plays a significant role in electability of Senators. Of the three data 
sets, the outlier is that of Ohio Senators Portman and Brown. A Republican trifecta state 
 
55 Montana State Legislature - Ballotpedia", Ballotpedia, 2020, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Montana_State_Legislature. 
56 Jeffrey B. Lewis, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 
(2020). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/ 
57 Jeffrey B. Lewis, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 













with a Democratic senator leaning further into their party ideology over the Republican 
senator is an outlier. There could be explanations for this. Brown has been in politics 
since 1975, always as a Democrat, and always working towards worker’s rights.58 His 
name recognition and history are very high in his state, allowing him to use his brand and 
cherry-picked voting record for reelection. This could play a significant role in his ability 
to consistently stay with party line ideals and still manage to be reelected each cycle.   
Analysis 
 When examining the data sets in this research, the trends from CQPress stand out. 
Regardless of state, Senators adjust their voting styles based on more than one factor. 
Depending on what party is in power in the Executive, majority in the Senate, and a 
Senator’s reelection year all contribute to how Senators vote. As states slowly move to 
more polarization, the amount of split party delegations is decreasing.59  
 Senator Manchin from West Virginia is the most interesting of these Senators. He 
not only has the closest to zero DW-NOMINATE score, in his most recent reelection 
year he crossed party lines more than voted with his chosen party.60 61 As a Democratic 
Senator from West Virginia which is a majority Republican state, the logic behind 
 
58 Sherrod Brown. (2017). In CQ-Roll Call (Ed.), Politics in America 2018. The 115th Congress. 
Washington, DC: CQ-Roll Call, Inc. Retrieved from 
http://library.cqpress.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congress/pia115-Brown-Sherrod 
59 Gailmard, Sean, and Jeffery A. Jenkins. "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in 
the Senate." American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (2009): 324-42. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548121. 
60 Jeffrey B. Lewis, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet 
(2020). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/ 




Manchin’s movement to the right regardless of party identification is something to be 
considered.  
 When examining the trends of party support of the above Senators, each have 
their own increase and decrease. The below chart of party support of the Senators 
combined showcase that during Presidential election cycles regardless of if the Senator 
was up for reelection, their party support adjusted downward. I believe this to be for two 
main reasons, the first is visibility. Once a Senator is in office, their main goal is to 
represent their constituents in Washington D.C. During Presidential election cycles, the 
country tends to pay a bit more attention to the workings of the federal government, as 
was the case in 2016. With the twenty-four-hour news cycle focused on a highly 
contested Presidential election, Senators across the board trended toward moderation over 
extremism because they were more visible to their constituents.  
 The second reason is self-preservation. Of the Senators examined, Senator 
Portman was the only Senator up for reelection in 2016. His party support took a 12-point 
drop from the previous year, which showcases his adjustment of voting not only during a 
reelection year, but one in which there was also a Presidential election. Senators Brown, 
Tester, and Manchin were up for reelection in 2018. Of the three, Senator Brown was the 
only Senator to not adjust his party support, it was kept at 99%. This could be due to 
Senator Brown’s political history, or party conviction. Surprisingly, Senator Manchin has 
the largest drop in reelection cycles, at 17 points, going so far as the support the 




Figure 8: Party Support by Senator 
 In addition to their voting choices and their support of party platforms, there are 
other items to consider with each set of Senators within this research. Do they ever agree 
with each other outside of voting? Senator Portman and Senator Brown of Ohio have 
chosen on numerous occasions to work with each other for the people they represent, and 
they have also chosen not to attack the other Senator when one is up for reelection, even 
if they publicly support their challenger.63 In similar fashion, Senator Tester and Senator 
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Daines of Montana have worked together and crossed party lines as well in order to 
achieve results for their constituents.64  When speaking about his new junior Senator; 
Senator Manchin took the same tone as the previous comparisons. Working for the 
people of his state, regardless of party, was the most important part of his job. Though 
Senator Capito would be the junior Senator from West Virginia, it was their job to work 
together.65 
 Looking at these pairs of Senators, the common thread is they publicly say they 
will work together, even if they choose not to when it comes to voting. Rather than 
attacking or undermining their counterpart in the Senate, they have chosen the proverbial 
high road to maintain decorum with their colleague. In doing so, each of these Senators, 
regardless of party, are protecting their brand within their state and showing on the 
surface a willingness to work with other members of the Senate.  
Conclusion 
Are Senators from split party delegations going to continue to trend toward the 
majority party in their State Legislature? Was the Seventeenth Amendment anything 
more than a removal of State input in the Federal government? Does party identification 
matter over voting record? These questions are something more to explore, but within 
this research, it is shown that minority party Senators in split delegations either double 
down on their party platform with a few key votes opposite their party platform, or they 
 
64 Martin Kidston, "Tester And Daines: The Art Of Compromise In Washington, D.C., Isn’t 
Dead", Missoula Current, 2019, https://missoulacurrent.com/government/2019/02/tester-daines-
compromise/. 




succumb to the pressures of their majority party counterparts in order to remain in their 
position.  
Senators do work with one another, produce bipartisan bills, and vote against their 
party platforms. These cases of Senators highlight their personal voting records, but also 
highlight their public persona for their electorate. This combination of factors has assisted 
in making each Senator more marketable. By highlighting their accomplishments and 
cases when they voted against their party, minority party Senators in split delegations can 
appeal to voters in ways their majority party counterparts cannot.  
While DW-NOMINATE scores, party support rankings, and other models are 
worthwhile to use in research, it is impossible to create a full picture of whether minority 
party Senators always change their voting styles when up for reelection. The current 
political climate plays part in that, as states are moving to more partisan control, but 
because of the Seventeenth Amendment, the election of Senators is not through a possible 
gerrymandered process or State Legislature makeup. It is strictly up to the people who 










Chapter Two: Polarization of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
How the Growth in Polarization of the 
Supreme Court is Leading the Potential 
For Ideology to Influence Policy at the 
Judicial Level. 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court of the United States was not designed to be apolitical. The founders 
left much of the detail of the Judicial Branch so vague that the parameters of the Judicial 
branch were laid out in the Judiciary Act of 1789,66 only after the first Congress was 
sworn in and George Washington was elected President. Throughout the Federalist 
Papers and other historical articles, the discussion of the Judicial branch and its 
impartiality were a large focus. At different points throughout history, the idea of the 
Supreme Court becoming a third partisan branch of the federal government has not gone 
undiscussed,67 but in today’s government of Adversarial Legalism68 the question 
 
66 Engrossed Judiciary Act, September 24, 1789; First Congress; Enrolled Acts and Resolutions; General 
Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; National Archives. 
67 Michael Nelson. 1988. “The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Episode of 
1937.” Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science) 103 (2): 267. Doi: 10.2307/2151184. 
68 Robert A. Kagan. 2001. Adversarial Legalism. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/login.aspx?direct-
true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=nlebk&AN=282054&site-ehost-live&scope=site. 9 Definition: adversarial 
legalism—a method of policymaking and dispute resolution with two salient characteristics. The first is 
formal legal contestation—competing interests and disputants readily invoke legal rights, duties, and 
procedural requirements, backed by recourse to formal law enforcement, strong legal penalties, litigation, 
and/or judicial review. The second is litigant activism—a style of legal contestation in which the assertion 
of claims, the search for controlling legal arguments, and the gathering and submission of evidence are 




becomes about the polarization of the Supreme Court. The question this paper addresses 
is: has the polarization of the Supreme Court created an unstable and potentially 
dangerous foundation for the interpretation of laws and policy within the United States? 
To address this question, this paper looks at three different schools of thought on 
the polarization of the Supreme Court, construct data from the Martin-Quinn scoring 
method on judicial ideology,69 analyze the results of polarization from the six post New 
Deal Courts, and discuss how polarization impacts the Supreme Court. Upon looking at 
the data of how the Supreme Court has moved from center bias to polarization, this 
chapter showcases that since the New Deal the polarization of the Supreme Court has 
expanded, providing the groundwork for the Supreme Court to alter policy from 
Congress based off their power of Judicial review and the Court’s interpretation of vague 
legislative language Congress employs when writing policy.  
The United States Supreme Court is the decider of disputes, but it has also 
become a policymaker in the United States Federal government. Article III of the 
Constitution reads, “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour.”70 The framers of the United States Constitution left the 
rest of the structure of the courts up to Congress.  
 
69 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999." Political Analysis. 10:134-153 




Since the founding of the United States, much has changed in the operation and 
interrelationships of the three branches. The Executive and Legislative branches each 
have very distinct powers and structures awarded to them in the United States 
Constitution, along with membership amounts and roles.71 Article III does not provide the 
Judicial branch the same specificity in the Constitution, and this has allowed the least 
political branch of the United States government to slowly turn towards polarization of 
politics and power of ideology. 
 Impartiality is a virtue judges do their best to attain, but everyone has personal 
views, biases, and canons for their ideology. The important factor for judges is how their 
biases affect their rulings and their interpretation of cases brought before them. The 
United States Supreme Court is responsible for interpretation of statutes, over time it has 
become the decider in policy disputes between the Legislative and Executive Branches.72  
 The Supreme Court has a rich history of tradition and decorum. What makes the 
Supreme Court different from the other branches of the federal government is its lack of 
political party affiliation. According to the Supreme Court’s website, “To ensure an 
independent Judiciary and to protect judges from partisan pressures, the Constitution 
provides that judges serve during ‘good Behaviour,’ which has generally meant life 
terms.”73 The idea of an independent Judiciary is an important part of the federal 
government, and as such it is an ideal that should be preserved. With party polarization 
 
71 The Constitution Of The United States: A Transcription", National Archives, 2020, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript. 
72 Mark C Miller and Jeb Barnes, Making Policy, Making Law (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004). 




becoming more common within the federal government, that puts the Judiciary at risk of 
political polarization, specifically because of the nuclear option enacted under the term of 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell on April 6, 2017 to confirm Justice Neil 
Gorsuch to the Supreme Court after his confirmation failed under normal procedure.74  
Critical Literature Review 
The United States Supreme Court has always been political, it is naïve to think 
otherwise when it is politicians nominating and confirming Justices, but the founders 
designed the Supreme Court to be the “least dangerous branch.”75 The polarization of the 
Supreme Court has been discussed, not to the same extent as Congress, but scholars and 
academics have looked to the ideology of Supreme Court Justices for decades. There is 
an enormous amount of literature on the subject, and the argument is not that the 
Supreme Court is or is not polarized, but rather how it is polarized. When looking at three 
distinct schools of thought on the polarization of the Supreme Court: Landes-Posner 
analysis, the Hasen analysis, and the Clark analysis, the trend that emerges is that while 
the Supreme Court is generally considered in two camps of conservative and liberal, it is 
how the Court arrived at that polarization and to what extent that polarization is 
prevalent. Whether it be political parties, the United States as a whole, or the Court itself- 
the three analyses discussed agree that the Supreme Court is polarized, but not because of 
the Justices themselves, rather, a result of outside forces.  
 
74 "U.S. Senate: Senate Floor Activity - Thursday, April 6, 2017", Senate.Gov, 2017, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/floor_activity/2017/04_06_2017_Senate_Floor.htm. 
75 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (repr., New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 464. 
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Political Party Polarization- Landes & Posner Analysis 
 In their widely noted study, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner dissected 
both the ideological classifications of Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as Justices’ 
fervent move to a more ideological extreme based on their nominating political party76. In 
Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, Landes and Posner use a combination of 
methods to dissect the ideology of Supreme Court Justices as well as Appellate Court 
justices. They examine not only the ideology, but they also include the single majority 
opinions in their analysis. Landes and Posner devised their own method of classifying 
Justices using multiple scoring methods derived by others and combining them into a 
new hypothesis. In their paper, the authors note that the assumption of how Supreme 
Court Justices vote based off their nominating president is typically accurate and discuss 
how Justices over time adjust their ideology to the more extreme cases: “this ‘ideology 
drift’ is consistent with the correlation between the appointing President’s party and a 
Justice’s ideology.”77 They also find no conformity effect for Justices to go along with 
the majority opinion if the Justice dissented. This is an important factor- a Supreme Court 
Justice should not feel compelled to vote with the majority opinion just because the 
majority opinion is made up of Justices confirmed by the same presidential political 
party.  
 Their primary contribution with their work results in the aspect of correcting other 
databases on incorrect or lacking data as well as their statistical analysis of the ideology 
 
76 William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, Journal of Legal 
Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 2, Summer 2009, Pages 775–831, https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/1.2.775 
77 William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, Journal of Legal 
Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 2, Summer 2009, Pages 775–831, https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/1.2.775, 59 
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of Supreme Court Justices. What is missing from Landes and Posners’ analysis is the lack 
of Justice’s own ideology, which is central to studying the polarization of the Supreme 
Court. While outside factors play a role in becoming a Justice on the Supreme Court, 
once on the Court it is up to the Justice and their ideology.  
Polarization Due to The United States- Hasen Analysis 
 In his article, Polarization and the Judiciary, Richard L. Hasen analyzes the 
polarization of the Supreme Court, arguing the United States’ polarization as a whole 
proves the culprit, rather than the individual ideologies of Supreme Court Justices.78 
Hasen uses four main ways to highlight how polarization has affected the Supreme Court; 
judicial selection, decisions Justices make, the country viewing the Supreme Court 
through a partisan lens based on decisions, and the effect of polarization on the separation 
of powers.79 Looking at the Supreme Court’s polarization as a result of outside forces and 
not the Justices themselves has merit, a Justice cannot become a justice without the 
nomination of the President and the confirmation of the Senate. As Hasen notes in his 
work, “all the Court liberals have been appointed by Democratic presidents and all the 
Court conservatives have been appointed by Republican presidents.”80 When looking at 
ideologies, this generally holds true, but not always. There are Justices on the Supreme 
Court who have shifted their ideologies over time. Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts 
has begun to swing into the liberal bloc of Justices with his Martin- Quinn ideology 
score. 
 
78 Richard L. Hasen, 2019. Polarization and the judiciary. Annual Review of Political Science 22 (1): 261-
76, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051317-125141. 
79 Ibid, 261 
80 Ibid, 261 
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 Within his work, Hasen references the Martin-Quinn ideology scoring method as 
a good indicator but raises questions of endogeneity which he does not elaborate on.81 
When analyzing the Supreme Court there are different factors to consider, but for the 
research within this paper, the Martin-Quinn ideology scores that will be used offer a 
straightforward and plain model to study, rather than over complicating the potential 
polarization with outside influence. For Hasen’s analysis, the Martin-Quinn ideology 
scoring method may not apply, because in his view, the polarization of the Supreme 
Court comes not from the Justices themselves, but a multitude of factors. Overall, 
Hasen’s analysis provides insight into one school of thought on the polarization of the 
Supreme Court. It does not encompass every idea but does include a wide range of 
thought processes and reasoning behind the polarization.    
Polarization From the Court Itself- Clark Analysis 
 In his article for Political Research Quarterly, Tom S. Clark looked at empirical 
evidence in the polarization of the Supreme Court and created a basis for understanding 
the voting blocs of the Supreme Court. Noting that the Supreme Court has not been as 
studied for ideological preferences as members of Congress have,82 Clark looks to 
previous scholarship of the idea of Supreme Court polarization, specifically refencing 
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal as well as Fiorina. Citing other studies, Clark critiques 
previous scholarship as it looks for patterns in coalition forming and how predictability 
regarding votes.83 The goal of the Supreme Court is not for policy preferences, but Clark 
 
81 Richard L. Hasen, 2019. Polarization and the judiciary. Annual Review of Political Science 22 (1): 261-
76, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051317-125141. 267 
82 Tom S. Clark, "Measuring Ideological Polarization On The United States Supreme Court", Political 
Research Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2008): 146-157, doi:10.1177/1065912908314652, 147. 
83 Ibid. 147 
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notes “if policy preferences influence judges’ votes, then one should expect that a more 
polarized Court will lead to more fractured decisions.”84 Clark argues that the method of 
calculating the distance between the medians of polarization is insufficient for the study 
of the Supreme Court, arguing that the Supreme Court is too small a sample,85 but that is 
an ill-advised theory. In looking at the median and absolute distance between the 
ideology scores of Supreme Court Justices, this research will apply the ideology of 
Justices to polarization across almost a 100-year span of time. When put into a figure, it 
is apt to see the changes over time as well as the ebbs and flows between differing 
ideologies.  
 Clark used the Esteban and Ray model86 in his research which works well on 
polarization but lacks the context of individualism compared to the Martin-Quinn scoring 
method. Additionally, Clark uses the ideology estimates from two separate scoring 
methods (Segal- Cover and Judicial Common Space) within his application to make a 
more robust case that the Court’s polarization and use of heterogeneity are the drivers 
behind the Courts decisions.87 The Judicial Common Space scores are based off Martin-
Quinn’s scoring methods and use much of the same data in the analysis as Justice’s 
scores change over time and with Court decisions made.  
 Clark’s analysis of the Supreme Court touches on the Warren and Burger Courts 
but does not offer a comprehensive data analysis of multiple Courts nor individual 
Justices. Clark notes “ideological polarization on the Supreme Court is an issue that has 
 
84 Tom S. Clark, "Measuring Ideological Polarization on the United States Supreme Court." Political Research 
Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2009): 146-57. Accessed November 21, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27759852, 146 
85 Ibid, 147 
86 Ibid, 148 
87 Ibid, 151 
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intrinsic importance,”88 for which he is correct. The macro-analysis he supplies in this 
research provides a surface level comparison of the Supreme Court over time with 
additional data on the Warren and Burger Courts. The research supplied within this thesis 
will rely on the Justice’s own ideological scores, overall Court scores, and the gradual but 
significant polarization of Justices over time.  
Methodology 
 For this research, the focus will be on the post New Deal Supreme Courts, 
specifically the Stone Court, Vinson Court, Warren Court, Burger Court, Rehnquist 
Court, and the Roberts Court. With the Judicial branch taking a more active role in the 
policy process interpreting legislative language over deciding disputes, the makeup of the 
Supreme Court plays an important role. As Justices are selected by the President for 
confirmation in the Senate, it is logical to assume that a President will select a Justice that 
aligns similarly with their policy interpretation. When a President has a Senate that is also 
in their party majority, they can choose a more ideologically polarized Justice than if they 
have a Senate that is of the opposite party in majority.  
Martin Quinn Scoring 
The baseline data focused within this research is from Andrew D. Martin and 
Kevin M. Quinn. Martin-Quinn scoring looks at cases, decisions, opinions, and other 
aspects of the Supreme Court Database to create a comprehensive ideology score of 
Justices and Courts.89 Using this data will assist in the analysis of if methods of 
 
88 Tom S. Clark, "Measuring Ideological Polarization on the United States Supreme Court." Political Research 
Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2009): 146-57. Accessed November 21, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27759852. 154 
89 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999." Political Analysis. 10:134-153, 121 
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interpretations have a bearing on the ideology of the Court as a whole. Using other 
research models, they concluded previous works missed key components of the ideology 
of Supreme Court Justices.90 Using their data from The Supreme Court Database,91 this 
research will focus on the median ideology of the court per year as well as individual 
Justices and their ideology score. The figures for each court are independent of each other 
and note the differences in central ideology. This relates to policymaking, as over time 
the Supreme Court has moved from deciding the constitutionality of legislation and 
executive orders to interpreting the meaning behind policy and the intent of the words, 
thus the Supreme Court is creating policy where Congress has left it vague.  
 
90 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999." Political Analysis. 10:134-153, 121 
91 Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, Theodore J. Ruger, and Sara C. 
Benesh. 2019 Supreme Court Database, Version 2019 Release 01. URL: http://Supremecourtdatabase.org 
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Presentation of Results 
The Stone Court (1941-1946) 
92 
Figure 9: The Stone Court Median and Deviation 
93 
Figure 10: Stone Court Justices Ideology 
In a post New Deal era, the Stone Court had the ability to make changes where other 
Supreme Courts could not; but the Stone Court was not as proactive as it could have been 
because of its polarization and lack of a central ideology.94 It began with the appointment 
of Chief Justice Stone, who began his term as Chief Justice in 1941. Using the data from 
Martin and Quinn, the shift in median ideology in the Stone Court era was a reversal of 
liberal median to a conservative median, as shown in the figure above. During Chief 
Justice Stone’s tenure, the Court’s function shifted. As Melvin Urofsky notes, “The 
economic issues which had dominated the Court's calendar for nearly a half-century gave 
 
92 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain 
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94 Melvin I. Urofsky, "Conflict Among The Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas And The 
Clash Of Personalities And Philosophies On The United States Supreme Court", Duke Law Journal 1988, 
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way to new questions of civil liberties and the reach of the Bill of Rights, and these cast 
the jurisprudential debate between judicial restraint and judicial activism in a new 
light.”95 The Stone Court was the true start of the shift of the original design of the 
Supreme Court to a Court that would create policy with their rulings. President Roosevelt 
wanted to pack the Court by forcing Justices to retire, but this idea was defeated. 
President Roosevelt did pack the Supreme Court in a different manner, due to the number 
of Justices he was able to get confirmed during his presidency. What the data shows from 
Martin and Quinn is over time the Court’s majority shifted to a conservative viewpoint on 
cases.  
The Vinson Court (1946- 1953) 
96 
Figure 11: The Vinson Court Median and Deviation 
97 
Figure 12: Vinson Court Justices Ideology 
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The Vinson Court was a relatively short tenure of a Chief Justice within the research but 
was one of the largest shifts in ideology. When Chief Justice Vinson was confirmed in 
1946, the Court he inherited was coming off World War II and was on the conservative 
ideology side. The Court itself was divided into two sets of ideologies from the end of 
World War II through the start of the Cold War; and these ideologies fought over striking 
down government powers that could result in major consequences during the Cold War. 
Upon the deaths of two liberal Justices, Murphy and Rutledge, President Truman 
nominated Clark and Minton, both of which had extensive government, not just judicial 
experience.98 These Justices added to the conservative bloc of the Court, resulting in a 
major shift in overall Court ideology. 
 
98 Russell W. Galloway Jr. "The Vinson Court: Polarization and Conservative Dominance." Santa Clara 
Law Review 22, no. 2 (Mar 22, 1982): 375.  
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The Warren Court (1953-1969) 
99 
Figure 13: The Warren Court Median and Deviation 
100   
Figure 14: Warren Court Justices Ideology 
In terms of the Warren Court, much of the ideology comes from the outlier of 
Associate Justice Douglas, who made a sharp trend toward a very liberal ideology in the 
middle of the Vinson Court which continued to trend more liberal until his death. The 
Warren Court took place during the Civil Rights Movement, the start of the Vietnam 
War, and with two back-to-back Democratic presidents, the Court took on a sharp liberal 
ideology contrasting that of the Vinson Court. In a time when civil liberties were being 
protested and a new war taking shape, the Warren Court used its judicial review power 
and liberal ideology to uphold civil liberties that failed in previous Courts.  
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The Burger Court (1969-1986) 
101 
Figure 15: The Burger Court Median and Deviation 
102 
Figure 16: Burger Court Justices Ideology 
When Chief Justice Burger took over the Supreme Court at the end of 1968, he 
was chairing a Court that had one of its most liberal terms under Chief Justice Warren. 
That quickly changed with the election of President Nixon. Galloway notes, “The 
conservative dominance that has been the hallmark of the Burger era began in the 
October 1970 Term and remained in full force for at least six consecutive Terms. During 
this period, the Court's right wing substantially rewrote the law, moving the federal courts 
and, to some extent, the state courts from a posture of liberal activism to one of 
conservatism and restraint.”103 This idea is reflected in the table above, while the Court 
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under Chief Justice Burger was consistently conservative, there were dips towards a 
central ideology when Blackmun shifted more towards the center ideology from the 
right.104 With the Burger Court being decidedly conservative, it was up to the centrist 
Justices to work toward the balance.  
The Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) 
105 
Figure 17: The Rehnquist Court Median and 
Deviation 
106 
Figure 18: Rehnquist Court Justices Ideology 
Upon his appointment as Chief Justice, William Rehnquist inherited one of the 
most conservative Supreme Courts since the New Deal. Over time, and with the 
appointment of Justices such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Steven Breyer, the Rehnquist 
Court shifted to a more central ideology, but still on the conservative scale. Most notable 
in the table above, the Rehnquist Court highlights the ‘drift’ that can be found in many 
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Courts where the liberal bloc of Justices trend more the liberal polarization, whereas the 
conservative bloc trends more toward the center. 
The Roberts Court (2005-present) 
107 
Figure 19: The Roberts Court Median and Deviation 
108 
Figure 20: Roberts Court Justices Ideology 
The Roberts Supreme Court is the most current Supreme Court; the members are 
comprised of nominations from President Ford to President Trump. When Chief Justice 
Roberts was confirmed to the Supreme Court after a nomination by President George W. 
Bush, he was placed in the Chief Justice position. President Obama was able to confirm 
two Justices to the Court, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, shifting the Court’s 
median ideology to a liberal view. Had President Obama been able to nominate a third 
Justice (Merrick Garland), presumably the Court’s median ideology would have shifted 
further to the liberal side, but this nomination was blocked by Senate Majority Leader 
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Mitch McConnell.109 Like previous Supreme Courts, the Roberts’ Court determines what 
cases they will hear, but what makes the Robert’s Court different is there are Justices on 
the Court who were not chosen by a sixty vote Senate approval (Justice Gorsuch and 
Justice Kavanaugh). Without that threshold, the party politics that could play into future 
nominations are endless.  
Supreme Court Justices from 1941-2019 
110 
Figure 21: All Justices Ideology 
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The above chart is a culmination of all the Justices that have served on the Supreme 
Court since 1941. What is interesting to note about this is the polarization over time of 
the Martin-Quinn ideology scores of individual Justices. As the chart highlights, there are 
Justices who are outliers which can skew the data, but overall, the liberal and 
conservative blocs have begun to drift away from each other and are no longer 
centralized as they were earlier in the post new deal era. The analysis of this data in the 
next section will go into more depth as the occurrence of this, but the data from the 
Martin-Quinn scores highlights the overall drift from the center.  
Caseload of the Courts 
 111 
Figure 22: Average Case Count Per Court Per Year 
Additional research for this paper concerns the number of cases seen by each 
Court. Using data from the Supreme Court Database,112 taking the number of cases 
through Case ID number under each Chief Justice and then averaged the totals per year. 
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The information was not as was suspected, but interesting to note, thus its inclusion 
within the paper. The US Court website notes that the Supreme Court typically hears 
100-150 cases per year.113 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts average almost thirty less 
than the other Courts. There could be a multitude of reasons, the Roberts Court is hearing 
more complex cases, the Stone, Vinson, and Burger Courts were wartime Supreme 
Courts, or case load has decreased over time. Case ID’s are also used to cover whole 
cases, there may be different sections of overall cases under one Case ID with multiple 
rulings associated. While the shortest length of Court tenure is Stone’s Court at five 
years, the Roberts Court having less than half the number of cases compared to the 
Burger Court which was a much longer tenure and during the Vietnam War is an 
interesting piece of information. 
 Caseload is important to the idea of policymaking. If the Roberts Court is hearing 
more complex cases based on policy rather than simple Constitutionality, the number of 
cases does not play as significant a role. A larger data sampling and closer examination of 
the cases brought between these Courts is an opportunity to explore to see the balance of 
case types and outcomes for a more in-depth analysis. The importance of this data for this 
research is the sheer number of cases between the Stone to Burger Courts dwarf the 
number of cases in the Roberts Court on average.  
Analysis 
 The hope and idea the framers of the Constitution had when creating the Judicial 
branch, was the Supreme Court would be as apolitical as possible, but through research 
 




and study we have seen that is not the case. Not only have Justices become more 
polarized, but their responsibility has also shifted within the separation of powers as well. 
With Legislative and Executive branches taking less responsibility regarding 
policymaking, the Supreme Court has gained more power than it was designed to have.  
 The Supreme Court’s position within the federal government has changed, the 
weight of the Court’s decisions impact more than the parties represented within the case, 
they can often impact the country as a whole. Mikva and Lane note, “Judges are not 
automatons. They have policy preferences and form outcome preferences in particular 
cases. These preferences are sometimes so compelling that a judge may want to impose 
them as the law in a particular case despite statutory language to the contrary or evidence 
of statutory meaning to the contrary.”114 It is this preference that can become a larger 
issue when it comes to deciding policy. Mikva and Lane note that the Supreme Court 
does not usually act when statutory language is clear, but when it is not clear is when the 
Court must step in.115 Looking at the data of the six Courts in this research, the ideology 
changes for each, but most drastically within the Roberts Court. That is to be expected 
with the polarization of political parties in the United States. As elected officials within 
the Legislative and Executive branches grow more polarized, the logical conclusion is the 
preferences of the Court will change with nominations, which is in partial agreement of 
each of the three schools of thought discussed earlier within this paper. 
 While Rehnquist had the longest term of Chief Justice within this research, he 
also had the smallest amount of change in ideology within the Court. Unlike the Stone 
 
114 Abner J Mikva and Eric Lane, An Introduction To Statutory Interpretation And The Legislative 
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Court, which was primarily made up of Justices nominated by Roosevelt, the other 
Courts had multiple Presidential appointees. Robert A Kagan makes the point, “the most 
famous form of judicial policymaking in the United States arises from the courts’ power 
of judicial review- the authority to hold legislative statutes and executive branch 
decisions and actions unconstitutional.”116 Judicial review is not new within the federal 
government, but with a much larger Executive branch and independent agencies working 
on policy outside of Congress, the judicial review process is as important as ever. When 
justices have obvious preferences, the judicial review allows those preferences to play a 
role in a justice’s opinion on the statutory language and actions before them for cases.  
Policymaking was not the original intent of the Supreme Court, at least not 
directly. With the addition of judicial review, the increase in vague legislative language 
requiring the Court for produce legislative intent, and the decrease in central ideologies of 
the Court, the power of policymaking has taken a central role.  Udi Sommer notes, “In 
order to make strategic choices in a way that would serve their interests (setting policy 
closest to their ideal point), the inherent error is built into their strategic calculations. The 
literature indicates that the justices on the Supreme Court are often able to successfully 
act in a strategic fashion.”117 With this mindset, a polarized Court can adjust policy 
through their own lens, because legislative language and intent have given them that 
ability, along with their freedom to choose their own docket. 
 
116 Robert A. Kagan, Mark C. Miller, and Jeb Barnes. Making Policy, Making Law. Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004, 21. 
117 Udi Sommer, "How Rational Are Justices On The Supreme Court Of The United States? Doctrinal 




Impact of Judicial Review 
 In one of its earliest cases, the Supreme Court gave itself the power of judicial 
review. In Marbury v. Madison118 the Supreme Court granted itself the ability to strike 
down laws and statutes from both the Legislative and Executive branches based on the 
Court’s standards. From that decision in 1803, the dangers of political polarization were 
established within the Supreme Court. With judicial review, Congress and the presidency 
have become more inclined to nominate and confirm Justices who historically have the 
same viewpoints they do when creating policy. In their article Shikrishna B. Prakash and 
John C. Yoo note, “It should come as no surprise that when the Supreme Court has 
refused to enforce unconstitutional federal legislation, supporters of such legislation have 
questioned the legitimacy of judicial review.”119 Congress and the presidency have the 
power to change the ideology of the Judicial branch and with the terms of members of the 
Judiciary are for life, the ability to potentially alter the decision making for generations. 
Shifting to Policymaker 
 The Supreme Court’s function is to decide the legality of laws and statutes by 
using the Constitution for interpretation. The Supreme Court was not intended to function 
as the policymaker because of vague policy writing from Congress. Udi Sommer notes, 
“Having neither will nor force, the judiciary department is the least dangerous branch.”120 
 
118 John Marshall and the Supreme Court of the United States. U.S. Reports: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 
Cranch 137. 1803. Periodical. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep005137/. Through Chief Justice Marshall’s 
decision, the Supreme Court declared a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional and making it 
null and void. This established the basis of judicial review. 
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Law Review 70, no. 3 (2003): 887-982. Accessed May 4, 2020. doi:10.2307/1600662. 
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Sommers idea that the Supreme Court is the least dangerous branch has merit, but the 
idea of an independent judiciary is much more difficult in practice when the Supreme 
Court decides not only on the Constitutionality of a case, but the policy implications as 
well. 
Polarization and Policy 
 The nomination process of the Supreme Court by design is political, with the 
President nominating a Justice and the Senate confirming, but historically that does not 
mean a Justice would be politically polarized. Prior to 2017, the Senate was required to 
have a sixty-vote majority when confirming a Supreme Court Justice, creating a system 
where there must be bipartisan support in the confirmation process. After Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell used the nuclear option in Supreme Court nominations, 
requiring only a simple majority to confirm Justice Neil Gorsuch because his 
confirmation failed under normal procedures,121 the political ramifications of the 
nomination process changed the potentials for ideologies on the Court. What makes the 
Supreme Court different from the other branches of the federal government is its lack of 
political party affiliation. The idea of an independent Judiciary is an important part of the 
federal government, and as such it is an ideal that should be preserved. With party 
polarization becoming more common within the federal government, that puts the 
Judiciary at risk of the same fate. 
 





With polarization happening within the Legislative Branch as well as the 
Executive, one would hope that the Judicial Branch would retain its status as apolitical. 
Unfortunately, over time this has gone by the wayside, due in part to party politics within 
the other federal branches. Because of party polarization, the landscape for policymaking 
has also been altered. With more “swing” Supreme Court Justices, the ideals of the center 
could be upheld, but with more polarized Justices, the potential for policymaking to 
swing in a particular direction and keep hold becomes a much greater possibility. This 
does not mean that polarization of the Supreme Court diminishes its rulings, nor does it 
mean that those rulings cannot be overturned. Rulings of the Supreme Court have been 
overturned, whether because of changes in the Supreme Court ideology, or with new 
statutes passed by Congress.122 Overturning a Supreme Court decision is very difficult, it 
is not as simple as a different Court choosing to overturn a previous Court’s decision; it is 
a matter of Constitutionality, new statutes from Congress, or challenges of legislative 
intent. With the Supreme Court deciding legislative intent through judicial interpretation 
or judicial review, the question of judicial preference versus the Constitution can play a 
role. If more polarized Justices are placed on the bench, the ideology of those Justices 
could play a larger role in Supreme Court challenges to previous rulings or current law, 
such as Roe v. Wade. 
The question for this paper was has the polarization of the Supreme Court created 
an unstable and potentially dangerous foundation for the interpretation of laws and policy 
 





within the United States? As this paper demonstrated, since the New Deal, the Supreme 
Court has become more polarized, creating the groundwork for the Supreme Court to 
alter policy from Congress based off their power of Judicial review and the Court’s 
interpretation of vague legislative language Congress employs when writing policy. To 
see how the polarization of the Supreme Court has impacted rulings, more research and 
analysis needs to be done; specifically examining the voting blocs of Supreme Court 
rulings to see if the blocs align with the ideology used in the research in this paper. 
Additionally, another theory to research would be whether the Supreme Court 
polarization decreases after each installation of new administrations in the executive 
branch.  
What can be learned from the data and analysis from this paper is the theory that 
the Supreme Court is becoming more polarized is true when looking at Martin-Quinn 
ideology scores. Going forward, the analysis of Justice’s ideology should continue to be 
studied and examined for an increase in polarization or if the Supreme Court contracts 
once again. The data and analysis also provided additional insight to the impact judicial 
ideologies have on the Supreme Court. With the trend of polarization increasing, the 
potential of a swing Justice’s impact will play a larger role in cases where the Court is 
evenly divided between the ideology extremes.  
 Presidents can nominate as they wish for a Supreme Court seat, but it is up to the 
Senate to confirm or deny that person takes a seat on the nation’s highest bench. When 
the President has a Senate in their favor, party polarization is more likely to occur. When 
the President’s political party is the minority in the Senate, they choose a more central 
minded candidate in hope that will appease the Senate majority party. An instance where 
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this did not occur because of party polarization is with Merrick Garland. Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell blocked Garland’s nomination, citing that it was too close to 
the Presidential election. In doing so, Senate Majority Leader McConnell paved the way 
for President Donald Trump’s nominee, Neil Gorsuch, a more conservative Justice, to 
join the Supreme Court.  
What is noteworthy is the fact that Congress and the Executive designed the 
Judicial Branch, specifically the Supreme Court and its makeup, only now to have passed 
their own powers of policy creation to the Supreme Court. This shift in legalism is one 
that has taken power away from the people who elect the officials in the Executive and 
Legislative Branches and given the power to appointed people within the Judicial Branch. 
That power displacement adds to and enhances the adversarial legalism that has become 












Chapter Three: The Increase of Power 
with Executive Orders. How Modern 
Presidents Have Changed Executive 
Orders, Specifically the First Fifteen 
Executive Orders Issued. 
Introduction 
The Office of the President of the United States is arguably the most powerful 
position in the world for one person to hold. Over the course of United States history, the 
position of president has grown, changed, and become stronger than it was designed 
within the United States Constitution. For the president, nothing is mightier than the pen. 
Executive orders have been in existence since the founding of the United States, but they 
have changed. There is no record of executive orders as an explicit constitutional power, 
but presidential executive orders are regarded as law of the land and treated with the 
same reverence as legislation passed by Congress and signed into law. As Alexander 
Hamilton said in Federalist #70, “Energy in the executive is a leading character to the 
definition of good government”123 and to this day, that notion rings true; the energy of the 
executive changes the way which executive orders are produced.  Executive orders are an 
expedient method to fulfill campaign promises, take swift action in times of crisis, and 
ways to undo the work of previous administrations.  
Not all executive orders are created equal and not all executive orders are 
constitutional. When a president takes office, they have the power to act swiftly and 
 
123 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 421. 
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decisively with their pen. Executive orders in general have been studied at length as have 
the increase in executive orders over time. This paper does not address either one of those 
aspects of presidential executive orders. The question this paper asks is, have presidents 
effectively used their first fifteen executive orders, arguably the most powerful, to undo 
their predecessors work or have they chosen to move their vision of the United States 
forward with the power of the pen? 
To answer this question, this paper will analyze differences of opinion from 
various scholars on how they view executive orders and their effectiveness; collect data 
from presidents Reagan through Biden of their first fifteen executive orders respectively; 
analyze what presidents have done with their early executive power- new directives, 
revoke predecessors’ actions, or amended previous executive orders to fit a new 
narrative. Then, using this data, this paper will argue that presidents have changed their 
unilateral power pattern over the course of history, and will conclude with what we can 
do with this information going forward and how it can change the way presidents work in 
the future.  
Critical Literature Review 
An often quoted portion of the presidential powers in the Constitution reads to 
“faithfully execute”124 the laws of the United States, but is that what presidents are 
doing? The idea of executive orders is not new, nor is the implementation and 
controversy of executive orders. The questions to be asked are: how have presidential 
executive orders changed? Are presidents using executive orders to now fulfill campaign 
 




promises or is their primary initial goal to undo executive actions by previous presidents? 
This paper will examine and address modern presidents (Reagan to Biden) and their use 
of high priority executive action. What did theses presidents do with their first fifteen 
executive orders? Did they fulfill campaign promises and bypass Congress with 
legislation? Did they undo previous executive actions? Or did these presidents use the 
power of the pen to direct the government into a new, and in their view, better place for 
the American people? 
Executive orders have a place within the United States government, but they are 
not as “safe” as legislation. Why do presidents use executive orders to execute policy? 
Was there a divided Congress when they took office? Was the president the minority 
party when they took office? What did presidents view as their most important action? 
Specifically, this chapter examines their first fifteen executive orders. The moment a 
president takes the oath of office, they can begin signing executive orders. Scholars have 
studied executive orders in singular and comprehensive fashion but narrowing the focus 
to the first fifteen executive orders provides a window into the mentality of a president.  
While there is a wealth of literature on presidential executive orders, not all 
literature agrees with how and why presidents use executive orders. Three authors have 
written extensively on presidents and the power of the pen but come to different 
conclusions on unilateral presidential action. Each of these authors takes a different 
approach to their methodology and analysis of presidential executive orders. Sharece 
Thrower looks at entire presidential terms and the length of time an executive order is in 
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place before it is revoked by future administrations;125 Jeremy D. Bailey and Brandon 
Rottinghaus look at the types of executive orders presidents issue and whether they cite 
Congressional Authority, giving presidents a “safer” plane on which to issue their 
directives;126 and Kenneth Mayer takes a numerical approach to analyze the environment 
around a president and how it influences executive orders.127 Each of these methods of 
research are important to the examination of executive orders, but they are all 
overarching themes. Looking at the full presidency is important but looking at the initial 
actions of a president can give a better look into how presidents function with their 
newfound power.  
Revoking Executive Orders: Sharece Thrower Analysis 
In her article “To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of 
Executive Order Longevity,” Sharece Thrower analyzes how long presidential executive 
orders continue until they are revoked by future administrations. Her argument is that 
over time, presidential executive orders have moved from long standing directives to 
quick bolsters to a president’s promises to the people. Her analysis concludes with the 
thesis that her work “reveals the conditions under which presidents choose to alter 
executive orders and the qualities that facilitate their durability.”128 Her study is crucial to 
how executive orders are reviewed. She takes a narrow approach into the longevity of 
 
125 Sharece Thrower. “To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order 
Longevity.” American Journal of Political Science (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) 61, no. 3 (July 2017): 642-56. 
DOI: 10.1111/AJPS. 12294 
126 Jeremy D. Bailey and Brandon Rottinghaus, "Reexamining The Use Of Unilateral Orders", American 
Politics Research 42, no. 3 (2013): 472-502, doi:10.1177/1532673x13509836. 
127 Kenneth R. Mayer, "Executive Orders and Presidential Power." The Journal of Politics 61, no. 2 (1999): 445-
66. Accessed March 14, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647511. 
128 Sharece Thrower. “To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order 
Longevity.” American Journal of Political Science (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) 61, no. 3 (July 2017): 642-56. 
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executive orders and the quickness to which they will be overturned by future 
administrations. What Thrower does not include in her study, which would be helpful, is 
the timing of the overturning of the executive orders. Thrower examined the average age 
of an executive order, but further questions to be asked about her research are; did 
processes change in relation to the executive orders; was there a different conflict from 
the original executive order; or what has changed within the situation to justify the 
overturning of an executive order?  
The overarching concept of her study is that executive orders are becoming more 
frequently revoked by future administrations and the strongest argument Thrower makes 
is “As a result, these orders often have a time limit on the influence they wield.”129 
Executive orders are treated as law of the land, but they each have an expiration date, one 
that is up to either the Courts through judicial review, Congress in writing legislation, or 
a future president revoking or amending the executive order through a new unilateral 
action. Thrower’s analysis of the duration of executive orders is a compelling case and 
addition to this research because it highlights the gaps in the research of executive orders 
past the overuse of them and the polarization of them; it proves through case study 
statistical analysis that executive orders are not foolproof, and they are on borrowed time. 
Executive orders are frequently used a political weapon to move forward campaign 
promises or to undo previous administration’s stances, Thrower provides the groundwork 
for further study of executive orders and their uses.  
 
129 Sharece Thrower. “To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order 
Longevity.” American Journal of Political Science (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) 61, no. 3 (July 2017): 642-56. 
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Unilateral Orders- Power to Act Alone-Bailey & Rottinghaus Analysis 
 The authors of the paper Reexamining the Use of Unilateral Orders: Source of 
Authority and the Power to Act Alone, Jeremy D. Bailey and Brandon Rottinghaus, 
created a database of executive orders and presidential proclamations to test their theory 
that presidents make choices on whether or not to include the congressional authority 
they are using to create such an executive order. They note that is it a political calculation 
and a strategic choice as to why and when presidents cite Congressional Authority.130 
Citing other researchers, Bailey and Rottinghaus acknowledge that the research on 
presidential executive orders is constantly evolving, but like this research, sees a 
deficiency with previous research conducted. 
Within their work, the authors note that presidents often cite Congressional Authority, but 
not consistently. They argue that “Presidents should issue orders based on their own 
authority only under conditions in which they consider themselves most free.”131 This 
thought process is a flawed method as we have seen in modern presidents since the 
writing of this article in 2013. The data and research are broader in scope in comparison 
to Thrower’s data as well as the data that will be presented in this paper.  
Bailey and Rottinghaus used presidential proclamations in addition to executive 
orders, which assisted in proving their theory, but diminished the effectiveness of it by 
including presidential proclamations; they claimed “although proclamations are often 
ceremonial, presidents frequently issue proclamations treating policy.”132 While 
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proclamations do have value, they are not the same as executive orders, but 
proclamations serve the theory of Bailey and Rottinghaus- that presidents are 
increasingly issuing unilateral orders without Congressional authority citations and 
relying more on their own power. 
Much like what will be seen in the data within this paper, Bailey and Rottinghaus 
used their own judgement on deciding the source of the presidential action in their data, 
whether it be from a Congressional Authority or another.  
Presidential Environment and Executive Orders- Mayer Analysis 
 In his article Executive Orders and Presidential Power, political scientist Kenneth 
Mayer examines the frequency of executive orders in relation to the political environment 
in which a president resides.133 Throughout his work, Mayer argues that political 
scientists and scholars generally do not examine executive orders as closely as other 
factors of presidencies; he notes “Although the legal literature is extensive, there are 
limits to what such investigations can tell us about broader patterns of presidential 
behavior.”134 In agreement with this, both Mayer and this research take a different look 
into executive orders from presidents, but in unique manners. 
 On face value, the work of Kenneth Mayer provides an in-depth numerical look 
into executive orders by presidents. His process and viewpoint are that executive orders 
will vary on a variety of conditions: political party, beginning and end of term effects, 
and Congressional and public support. His expectation of executive orders “is that 
 
133 Kenneth R. Mayer, "Executive Orders and Presidential Power." The Journal of Politics 61, no. 2 (1999): 445-
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presidents will tend to issue more when (a) they lack strong support in Congress, and (b) 
when they experience low levels of popular support”135 has strong standing, but his 
analysis is subjective in nature to a point. Mayer’s strongest point is in his analysis of 
data that political party weakness in Congress does not produce more executive orders 
whereas low popularity does. This is counter to his initial hypothesis, but upon reflecting 
on the data, Mayer notes “Congress is too complex to be fully accounted for by a simple 
relationship between party differences and institutional collisions.”136 This is the crux of 
his argument that in turn works for the research in this paper. The use of executive orders 
is a complex system and difficult to discern. When too many variables are considered, the 
results of the research can become too broad for in-depth analysis. 
Conclusion 
 The common thread through each analysis is that executive orders are more than 
simple directives. The question that none answered but will be answered within this 
research is how the first executive orders are changing. Dr. Thrower provided context 
with her analysis into the length of time before an executive order is revoked; Bailey and 
Rottinghaus highlight the use of Congressional Authority from presidents to justify 
executive orders; and Mayer provides an in-depth look at the multifaceted approach 
presidents take when deciding on the use of executive order power. All of these processes 
are important and vital to understanding executive orders. They provide background, 
data, and analysis that is important to further the study of executive orders and their 
power. While noting the limitations in their studies it creates the groundwork for further 
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study in a narrower focus for this paper to see how and why executive orders are 
changing under modern presidents.  
Data 
 To fully understand the early executive orders of a presidency, the data in this 
analysis is divided into three main parts: the length of time for a president to sign fifteen 
executive orders, the types of executive orders signed, and political party division of the 
executive and legislative branches. These three indicators will provide the groundwork 
for how executive orders are changing, and what presidents do with their first use of them 
in office. 
Why the First fifteen Executive Orders 
 In choosing to limit the number of executive orders to examine in this analysis, it 
will provide a focus on the mindset of presidents shortly after they enter the office of the 
presidency. To choose timeframe over number of executive orders would diminish the 
dataset considerably, each president enters the office under difference circumstances and 
different challenges. By choosing to focus on the first fifteen executive orders over a set 
timeframe, it creates a level field for interpretation over timelines when there are different 
issues facing presidents. Other scholars have examined the entirety of executive orders 
from presidents, or executive orders from a small sampling around a major event. By 
examining the first fifteen executive orders, the data and analysis provide a clear set of 
data, timelines for that data, and similar basis for each president.  
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Types of Executive Orders 
 The different types of executive orders presidents utilize play a role in how 
presidents govern from the Oval Office. As Figure 23 highlights, no president has used 
their first fifteen executive orders in strictly one fashion. What is interesting is the divide 
of how presidents utilize the power of the pen. The data used in this research is compiled 
from multiple sources. First is the compilation of the differing types of executive orders 
presidents issued, using the Federal Register and National Archives. These sources 
include whether an executive order revokes a previous executive order, amends a 








Figure 23: Types of Executive Orders by President 
The variation of the how presidents use their executive order power is evident in 
Figure 23. President’s issue executive orders for a variety of reasons, but as this chart 
shows, the majority of executive orders are new, not to revoke previous president’s 
actions. President H.W. Bush, President W. Bush, and President Obama are the 
difference, however. Each president either amended or revoked a previous president’s 
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Reagan H.W. Bush Clinton W. Bush Obama Trump Biden
Amend 1 9 2 4 3 3 0
Revoke 6 3 1 5 6 2 2






























executive actions at the start of their time in office. Most notably, President Biden issued 
more new executive orders than any other president in this analysis.  
Time in Office  
Looking at the time in which president issue their executive orders is also very 
important. Using the National Archives, each president was calculated from their first day 
in office until their 15th executive order was signed.  
138 
Figure 24: Number of Days in Office 
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This is an important factor to examine in conjunction with the types of executive orders 
that a president issues because it provides an insight into presidential workings and 
highlights the differences in urgency of the use of executive orders. Since the Obama 
Administration, presidents utilize their executive orders at a much faster rate than 
previous presidents. In under two months in office, presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden 
issued fifteen executive orders- but President Biden completed that feat in two days.  
Political Party Division 
 The division of power within the federal government plays an important role in 
how the Legislative and Executive branches function. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in 
1824, “men by their constitutions are naturally divided into two parties.”139 In his letter to 
Henry Lee, Jefferson made the point that political parties are a part of how the 
government works. Including political parties in this research is an important part of the 
analysis. When a man enters the Office of the Presidency, his success is in part dependent 
upon the makeup of Congress. As Kenneth Mayer noted in his research, the makeup of 
Congress plays a role in the power a president has while executing executive orders.140 
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Table 1: Political Party Division of Legislative and Executive Branches 
When looking at the above table and the differences between the government 
divide when a president took office, the number one items to notice is every democratic 
president entered office with a unified government at their disposal. The question is, why 
would presidents choose to issue executive orders at a rapid-fire pace, when they have the 
power of Congress behind them? The first and simplest answer to that question is, were 
the majorities in Congress enough to defeat a filibuster. In the case of President Biden, 
the Senate has a 50-50 vote split, and his executive orders were largely new orders 
designed to counteract the COVID-19 pandemic. When the table of types of government 
and number of days in office are combined, the trend that emerges is that presidents who 
have had a unified government at their disposal, typically issue their first fifteen 
executive orders faster than presidents who enter office with a divided government.  
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Type of  
Government 
Reagan Republican Republican Democrat Divided 
H.W. Bush Republican Democrat Democrat Opposition 
Clinton Democrat Democrat Democrat Unified 
W. Bush Republican Democrat Republican Divided 
Obama Democrat Democrat Democrat Unified 
Trump Republican Republican Republican Unified 




 Examining the data of the previous charts and table create an interesting picture of 
presidents and their use of the executive order. President Reagan is the outlier, but 
presidents have consistently been using the power of the pen faster since H.W. Bush. The 
question that needs to be answered is, have presidents changed how their issue executive 
orders? When examining the three charts of data, the answer is clear- in recent years, 
presidents have changed not only the types of executive orders they issue, but more 
importantly the timeframe in which they do so. 
It is interesting to note that apart from President Trump, only Democratic 
presidents have entered the office with a unified government at their disposal. George 
H.W. Bush entered the office of the president with an opposition government in front of 
him, and he took the most time out of all presidents in this research to issue his first 
fifteen executive orders. At over 160 days,142 President George H.W. Bush was the most 
restrained of all the presidents to use the power of the pen. 
While the chart breaking down the different types of executive orders the 
presidents issued does not create a clear-cut image of presidents using the power of the 
pen initially to revoke previous orders, it does paint the picture that four of the seven 
presidents studied used more than half of their first executive orders to either amend or 
revoke previous executive orders. This trend was not the case with Presidents Clinton, 
Trump, or Biden. Each of these presidents chose to use their executive power to push 
forward campaign promises and make new changes to the government over revoking the 
 




plans of previous presidents. This does not mean that these presidents did not or will not 
go on to revoke more executive orders, but rather than starting their term in office 
undoing previous work, they chose to advance their own.  
 President George H.W. Bush took the longest to issue fifteen executive orders, 
but the interesting story is what he did with them. A majority of these executive orders 
were to amend or revoke the work of previous presidents, only issuing three “new” 
executive orders.  
 President Biden stands out among the other presidents in this research; he entered 
the office of the presidency with a crisis no other modern president has faced. President 
Biden took swift action within his first two days of office by signing thirteen new 
executive orders, eight of which were in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. If 
President Biden had not issued 8 executive orders on the pandemic, he would have taken 
sixteen days to issue fifteen executive orders.143 Though this would have still placed 
President Biden at the top of the list for speed in issuing executive orders, it would have 
brought him closer to the trend of other modern presidents in this research. It is important 
to note the extenuating circumstances in which President Biden entered office, by not 
doing so, the research in this paper could be construed without context.  
 Presidents are using other tools in which to push their policy ideas, campaign 
promises, and agenda forward. A limitation of this research is that it does not include 
presidential memoranda. Executive orders are given power much like law, but 
presidential memoranda are being used more frequently as a similar power. As Phillip J. 
 




Cooper notes, “memoranda are different in a number of important respects, beginning 
with the fact that they are not included in the requirements of the Federal Register Act 
and are governed by no systematic process for their development and issuance.”144 This is 
an important distinction that must be noted, and examined in the future. How many 
memoranda are issued in the same fifteen days of the presidents and what powers did 
those memoranda create? 
Conclusion 
 The idea that presidential executive orders are used as a political tool is not new, 
nor is it a disputed claim. The purpose of this research and analysis was to examine the 
first fifteen executive orders of a president to see if there is a pattern in how presidents 
choose to wield their power when they enter the office. As this data showed, presidents 
use their power in different ways and in different time spans, but they often use executive 
order power to push their agenda items forward while bypassing Congress. 
 There is more research and study that needs to be done when examining the early 
executive orders of a presidency. Data could be used for all presidents to see if there has 
been a broader trend over time, or if presidents are utilizing their power sooner in their 
presidency, as President Biden has done most recently.  
The initial hypothesis of this paper is that presidents are using their executive 
order power faster and using it to undo the orders of previous presidents. Overall, this has 
proved to be true with this data, but with a few noted exceptions. President Biden issued 
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more “new” executive orders rather than undoing the works of previous presidents, 
whereas presidents W. Bush and Obama used their power to revoke or amend the work of 
previous presidents. The highlight of this paper is that every democratic president entered 
the office with a unified government at their disposal, but republican presidents either 
faced a divided Congress or an opposition. More research needs to be done to see if the 
republican presidents succeeded in their executive order power or if they were stopped by 
the Courts and actions from Congress.  
 The argument that presidents abuse their power is common, and this paper shows 
that presidents use their power to “move the needle” in the direction they believe the 
United States needs to go, whether that be to revoke previous executive orders or bypass 










 Subtle changes to the federal government have altered the bedrock of governance 
in the United States. The goal and mission of this thesis was to examine singular “small” 
changes to each branch of the federal government and analyze how those changes have 
made a lasting impact from the original design of the Constitution. There are many 
reasons to the importance of this research, but the most important reason is to look to the 
future. These changes continue to modify the governance in the United States, but 
without these changes, the United States federal government would look very different. 
Findings 
 In Chapter One of this thesis, the implications surrounding the Seventeenth 
Amendment and split party delegations examined the balance of power in the Senate; a 
balance that changed from pre-Seventeenth Amendment. Without the Seventeenth 
Amendment it would be the responsibility of state legislatures to select United States 
Senators, diminishing the power of the people; but with the people choosing U.S. 
Senators, the power of the states in the federal government has diminished. Other studies 
have looked to understand the “why” of split party delegations, but this research looked 
at the delegations themselves. Rather than focus on the “why,” this study focused on the 
“how.” How do split party delegations keep getting elected? What do minority party 
senators do to retain the power the people have bestowed uptown them? 
 The research conducted found that minority party senators often change their 
voting style to keep favor among their constituents. Senator Joe Manchin of West 
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Virginia is often viewed as a swing vote in the Senate, and the research in Chapter One 
highlights that he often votes with the Republican party- giving him credence among the 
heavily Republican state of West Virginia. On the opposite side, Senator Sherrod Brown 
continuously votes along the Democratic Party line, but uses his relationship with Rob 
Portman, the Republican Senator from Ohio, as his bedrock of compromise. If the people 
investigated Senator Brown’s voting history over public comments, his constituents may 
view his actions in a different light.  
By using DW-NOMINATE145 scores as well as party support and opposition of 
senators, the research conducted highlighted the differences in split party delegations’ 
operations. Split party delegations use multiple tools to gain reelection and to appease 
their constituents to get reelected. The question asked in Chapter One was whether the 
Seventeenth Amendment changed the behavior of minority party senators in split party 
delegations, and as the analysis showed, minority party senators do change their styles in 
order to retain power and secure reelection. With these findings, the “small” change of 
the Seventeenth Amendment has had a profound impact on the makeup and working of 
United States Senators who are from split party delegations. When this is combined with 
how the Senate uses its power, the workings of minority party senators from split party 
delegations becomes a major change in the balance of power. 
 The second chapter of this thesis studied the polarization of the Supreme Court. 
There has never been an argument that the Supreme Court has ‘liberal’ and conservative’ 
blocs, but the research conducted for this thesis examined the historical significance of 
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that polarization. As this paper concludes, the Supreme Court has always been polarized, 
and has consistently over time become more so. 
 The research in chapter two used the Martin-Quinn146 scoring method of Supreme 
Court justices to establish the relationship of political ideology to that of the Supreme 
Court’s makeup. In using the post New Deal courts, the research conducted proved that 
over time, the Supreme Court has become more polarized. That is more important in this 
paper is not that the Supreme Court is polarized, but the implications going forward. With 
the use of the nuclear option147 to confirm Supreme Court justices, there is now a greater 
potential for a further increase in polarization of the Supreme Court. Had the sixty vote 
minimum remained in place, it would generally require bipartisan support in the 
confirmation process. If the Senate is controlled by the opposite political party from the 
president in the future, the installation of new Supreme Court justices could be delayed or 
tabled until a president offers a nominee that appeases the majority.  
 The third chapter in this thesis studied how presidents are using their early 
executive order power when taking office, specifically focusing on the first fifteen 
executive orders and the seven most recent presidents. This was done to give a set 
baseline of executive orders rather than the time in which they were made. Examining the 
timeframe in addition to the number of executive orders, as well as the political parties in 
power within Congress, highlighted the environment presidents entered to complete their 
agenda. 
 
146 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999." Political Analysis. 10:134-153 




 The research conducted looked at the types of executive orders presidents issued, 
whether new, amends previous executive order, or revokes a previous executive order.148 
Additional content examined was the political parties in power for both Congress and the 
Executive149 because the context it provided highlighted interesting findings of 
presidential power. The trend discovered in this research was that Democratic presidents 
entered office with a unified government, and all Republican presidents but President 
Trump entered office with either a divided or opposition Congress. With these factors in 
place, the data concluded that modern presidents are increasingly using their executive 
order power more urgently, but not that presidents are always undoing the work of 
previous presidents.  
 These three chapters are important for historical and future implications for the 
federal government. Small changes have occurred over time, and those changes have 
lasting effects on the operations and governance of the United States. Without the 
Seventeenth Amendment and split party delegations, the states would have retained 
power in the federal government; with the nuclear option for confirmation of Supreme 
Court Justices, the polarization of the Supreme Court may be increased; and with the 
increase in the utilization of executive orders by presidents, the bypassing of Congress 
can increase and provide further power to the Executive Branch. 
 
148 “Executive Orders Disposition Tables Index", National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/executive-orders/disposition. 
149 "Party Divisions Of The House Of Representatives, 1789 To Present | US House Of Representatives: 
History, Art & Archives", History.House.Gov, 2021, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-
Divisions/Party-Divisions/. 




Like all research, there are limitation to the work in this thesis as well, but with 
the questions posed, the limitations are not as expansive as in other research. Each of 
these chapters pose specific questions and future implications resulting in small changes 
from the original design of the Constitution. With these changes, there is room for further 
in-depth study as well as expansion to the questions posed. 
 Chapter One could have expanded to more split party delegations and over a 
larger historical period, showing a larger trend or showing different trends from pre- and 
post-Seventeenth Amendment adoption. Chapter Two could have expanded on the 
Supreme Courts, focusing on more than just post New Deal Courts to classify if the trend 
of polarization was more diminished or expanded in previous Courts. Additionally, the 
research could have examined the “swing” votes of each Supreme Court to see how that 
the divide of swing votes changed over time. Chapter Three could have expanded from a 
more historical context and examining all presidents at the start of their terms, as well as 
a deeper dive into what new actions presidents have taken. It could have had a deeper 
examination into the reinstating of previous executive orders and how often differing 
political parties volleyed the reinstatement and revocation of executive orders over time.  
Recommendations 
 Continued study of the branches of government and their changes is something to 
be considered going forward and is encouraged. This thesis has provided a groundwork 
for expansion, with some of those ideas in the limitations section. The continuous study 
of how small changes have impacted the federal government are vitally important to 
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understanding how the United States government works. If scholars and academics focus 
solely on the big picture, the small modifications could be led to being regarded as 
standard procedure. 
The study of split party delegations in the Senate could provide a window into the 
mindset and strategy of minority party senators in heavily dominated majority states. This 
information could assist other minority parties in states to work in getting senators 
elected. Regarding the Supreme Court, a more in-depth look into the slow polarization of 
the Court could be examined looking at earlier Supreme Courts and should continuously 
be watched for how the Supreme Court acts going forward. In examining the data of the 
Supreme Court in the future, there could be recommendations made to the use of the 
filibuster and cloture rules within the Senate. Presidential executive orders are a product 
of their environment, and worth studying in a manner that will highlight their use and 
ultimate goal. Looking at more historical records as well as future presidents could either 
assist in strengthening the argument that presidents are using executive order power to 
bypass Congress or they are using it to primarily undo the work of their predecessors.  
Final Thoughts 
The goal of this thesis was to examine how “small” changes to the federal 
government have lasting implications, and to explore the prospect of future repercussions 
to the government from such changes. Each branch of the federal government has 
changed over time, but the question of what those changes mean is something that is not 
often examined. The implications the “small” changes can have on the United States 
Federal Government’s structure and balance of power is different from the beginnings of 
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the nation and is evident as the analysis of this thesis shows, but even without these 
changes, the federal government would still have evolved to look different from its 
original inception.  
The message that has gotten lost in the workings of the federal government is how 
the balance of power was defined within the United States Constitution. The Founders 
were very careful in their language and created a new form of government because they 
did not want the United States revert to the systems of government from history, or to the 
English Monarchy. Because of this fear and trepidation, the Founders created a system 
with checks and balances that were deliberate and intentional in their usage. This thesis 
has explored how those balances of power have shifted through changes to individual 
branches. With the direct election of senators, the balance of power shifted toward the 
people and away from the states; with the polarization of the Supreme Court and the 
power of judicial review, the balance of power shifted from Legislative and Executive 
branches towards the Judicial branch; with the changes to executive orders, the balance of 
power shifted away from the Legislative branch in favor of the Executive branch. 
Without each of these changes to the federal government, the balance of power would not 
have shifted in these specific ways.  
It needs to be noted that the Founders had no notion that the United States Federal 
Government would attain the amount of power it currently wields, but the Founders did 
attempt to create a government that would be able to sustain changes to its power. In 
Federalist 48, James Madison notes that of the three branches, “none of them ought to 
possess, directly or indirectly, and overruling influence over the others in the 
administration of their respective powers… The next and most difficult task is to provide 
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some practical security for each, against the invasion of others. What this security ought 
to be is the great problem to be solved.”150 The security of the independence and cohesive 
work of the three branches of the federal government was a different task when the 
Constitution was written. The checks and balances of power had clearer lines than the 
checks and balances of today. It is up to the people, the elected officials, and the rest of 
the Federal Government to examine the power division and the checks provided to each 
branch. As this thesis has demonstrated, if an evaluation of the checks and balances of 
power in a polarized government is not done, the future of the federal government could 
become imbalanced and create an unstable system of governance that will be difficult to 
return from. 
Each branch has given and taken power from other branches, expanded their own 
power with new measures, and expanded the role of the federal government that was not 
the intent of the Founders. The beginning of this thesis noted that “small” changes are not 
about groundbreaking massive structural change, but normalized changes that have a 
lasting impact on governance. Each chapter within this thesis analyzed a singular change 
to each branch of the Federal Government and how those “small” changes have created a 
different type of governance. If these changes go unchecked, their normalized nature can 
further divide the United States and encroach on the pillars of the separation of powers. 
As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist #51, “If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary… In framing a government which is to be administered 
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to 
 
150 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 305 
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control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”151 As this thesis 
demonstrates, both the government and the governed have changed, but the difficulty of 
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